The optimal mechanisms for controlling occupational safety and health are not obvious. While the appropriate fonn of regulation surely varies across countries, much may be learned from other experiences. It is the purpose of this essay to review American occupational safety and health regulation so as to provide a basis for the reader to detennine the lessons which are generalisable to their country. Regulation of occupational safety was one of the earliest fonns of govẽrnment intervention in the American workplace. Although such legislation is over 100 years old, 1 its character has dramatically changed in the past decade. This new interest in occupational safety and health has given rise to a substantial number of empirical studies about the workplace impact of such regulation. It is these empirical studies that will be emphasized in this review.
The optimal mechanisms for controlling occupational safety and health are not obvious. While the appropriate fonn of regulation surely varies across countries, much may be learned from other experiences. It is the purpose of this essay to review American occupational safety and health regulation so as to provide a basis for the reader to detennine the lessons which are generalisable to their country. Regulation of occupational safety was one of the earliest fonns of govẽrnment intervention in the American workplace. Although such legislation is over 100 years old, 1 its character has dramatically changed in the past decade. This new interest in occupational safety and health has given rise to a substantial number of empirical studies about the workplace impact of such regulation. It is these empirical studies that will be emphasized in this review.
The first section briefly describes the legal structure of regulation which includes both the fed~ral Occupational Safety and Health Act 19 70 ( OSH Act) and the individual state workers' compensation laws. The survẽy of empirical results is divided into 2 sections; one on the OSHAct" arid a second on wo.rkers' compensation laws. Current developments in
American occupational safety and health regulation are then reviewed followed by a conclusion.
The regulatory framẽwork
American policy toward occupational safety and health has two tundamental goals: the prevention of accidents and disease and the provision of medical care and income security to injured workers. The government's role in the pursuit of these goals has many facets: however, the policies which fonn the heart of our regulatory effort are the OSHAct and 124 James R. Chelius workers' compensation.
•
The regulation of industrial safety using government-mandated standards and mspectors was carried out at the state level for many years. While no one argued that these modest efforts had a large impact (Sands, 1968; Chelius, 1974) no great problem was perceived because the trend in injury rates was steadily downward. In the 1960's however, injury rates began to rise. This change in injury rates plus a change in political climate which made federal intervention on a wide range of issues much more acceptable, combined to yield the OSHA ct. Interestingly, it was subsequently demonstrated that this injury rate increase was, in large part, a reflection of cyclical factors rather than a reversal of the long term trend. The 1960s saw a substantial increase in the number of young and inexperienced workers as well as an unusually long upswing in the level of business activity -both factors being key detenninants of the injury rate. (Chelius, 1979) The OSHAct provided for federal government promulgation of safety and health standards which were to be enforced by inspectors with the power to fme erring employers. States were allowed to maintain their own programs if such efforts were certified as being at least as effective as the federal policy.
As part of the OSHAct, Congress established a National to study the states' workers' compensation laws and make recommendations for their reform. (Report, 1972) The Commission heartily endorsed the basic principle of workers ' compensation, that is, the no-fault liability of employers for workplace injuries with the quid pro CfUO of employer immunity from tort actions by employees. While the Commission made many detailed recommendations for the refonn of the state laws, the key suggestions were for substantial increases in the compulsory benefits payable to injured workers. If the states did not comply with the key recommendations, the Commission urged the Congiess to mandate compliance. Since not all states complied with all recommendations, there were several bills proposed in the Congress during the mid-1970s to mandate benefit levels and other minimum standards for each state's law. These Congressional proposals did not pass, so the workers' compensation system remains based on state statutes. The tlirust of the recommendations, however, was embodied in the laws of most states; the Commission largely had its entended impact. Benefit levels for injured workers increased a unprecedented 43 percent in the period from 1972 through 1980, even after adjusting for tile impact of inflation. (Worrall, forthcoming) The dual goals of occupational safety and health policy, prevention and security, are aotheds used to indirectly measure OSHA's impact on safety are quite diverse.
(1979a) compared the injury rate experience of firms inspected early in a year to talpected late in the year. He reasoned that, if inspections had a beneficial impact on this effect would show up more in the annual injury rates of those fmns inspecearlr than those inspected late. The impact of inspections on injury rates in the followtil rear was also examined. The econometric methodology held a series of other factors
; t, including changes in employment levels and prior injury rates. The conclusion that the 1973 inspections lowered injury rates in small futns. No effect from 1974 was observed. These inconclusive results warranted a follow-up study which COJJducted by McCaffrey (forthcoming). This study repeated the same analysis for , 1977 and 1978. He concluded there was no evidence of a benefiCial effect on injury from OSHA's inspections during these years.
(1979) used different methods to examine the impact of OSHA. He compre and post 1970 injury rates using data from one state's workers' compensation ayatent. The data were refmed so that only the type of injuries most likely to be influenced 1tr ltalldards and inspectors was included. These injuries were those resulting from a victim "caught in or between" machinery. The results indicate that for the early 1970s
IICh iajurles were lower than would have been predicted based on past experience; however, the results do not appear to hold up as subsequent years are added to the data base (Viscusi, 1983) .
Another study of a single state compared changes in injury rates over the period 1970 to 1976 between inspected and non-inspected fmns (Cooke and Gautschi, 1981) . They found tUt iaapected fums were more likely to have a decrease in injury rates over this period. The results applied only to fu1ns with more than 200 employees. This same study examthe impact of joint union-management safety committees and found they had a effect that was greater than the regulatory impact.
Tbe most comprehensive examination of country-wide data is Viscusi (1979a • 126 James R. Chelius ment, and injury rates. No impact of OSHA on either investment or injury rates was discernible. The net conclusion of these studies is apparent. Some positive results of OSHA have been observed, but even the most optimistic interpretation is one of a small impact. The overall weight of the evidence, is that it has not been significantly effective in improving safety.
Health
In the United States, there is much more of a consensus on the appropriateness of regulating occupational health than on regulating occupational safety. Many feel that the forces of the private marketplace including unions are able to achieve the desirable amount of safety. The key reasons being that both workers and employers are felt to have sufficient information and motivation as to safety hazards and prevention techniques, and certainly more insight than government agencies into the specific problems of individual worksites. The consistently observed presence of wage premiums for ha1.ardous work (Smith, 1979b) and employer difficulties retaining workers in dangerous environments (Viscusi, 1979b) are often cited as evidence of the working of these market forces. Many of those most critical of OSHA's safety efforts are sanguine about its possibilities in occupational health. While enjoying more support for its potential usefulness, the manner in which OSHA has actually regulated health is quite controversial. The agency has and continues to place its primary effort on safety rather than health; occasional rhetoric to the contrary notwithstanding. In over 10 years only 11 health hazards have been addressed with standards; the number of citations has been miniscule.
The empirical evidence on OSHA's impact is of a different sort than the evidence on safety. The frequently long and uncertain interval between exposure and illness makes workplace testing of the results derived from health standards a task for the future. In many cases, however, we have medical evidence on the likely effectiveness of a particular standard if it is observed. Based on the assumption that they are effective, several policy evaluations have been done on the efficiency of these standards. As defmed above, the general notion of efficiency concerns whether prevention resources are mandated in a way which maximizes worker health.
Even raising the issue of policy efficiency is often viewed as evidence of at least stinginess or more likely anti-worker bias. The point, however, is a simple one. Given a limit on our individual and collective willingness to expend resources on prevention, we certainly want to allocate these resources in the manner they do the most good. We would not want • to impose a health standard costing $100 million and saving 10 lives if that meant not being able to impose an alternative standard costing the same amount and saving 100 lives. Many would, of course, argue that we should do both and perhaps we should; but it maximizes worker well-being if we exhaust the opportunities for greater health improvement before we spend prevention resources in areas with lesser rewards. 4 The OSHAct mandated that health standards be established which assure, " ... to the extent feasible, ... that no employee will suffer material impainnent of health ... ".Consistent with the probable intent of Congress, OSHA has usually interpreted "feasible" (and other qualifiers such as " as far as possible" and "insofar as practicable") as meaning technologically possible, rather than efficient.
The Supreme Court has reviewed this issue in 2 recent cases. In a 5 to 4 vote, the Court invalidated a benzene exposure standard stating that a "significant risk" must be demonstrated before a standard is implemented (Benzene, 1980) . This affu1ned a lower court's ruling that there was no evidence that the standard bore a "reasonable relationship to its workers' compensation costs to be saved; and the greater the workers' compensation benefits to be saved, the more employers would be willing to spend. This simple notion of willingness to spend more to avoid a greater penalty is complicated, however, by the impact workers' compensation might have on etnployees. In the same manner that workers' compensation benefits increase the cost of an injury to the employer, they reduce the cost of an injury to the worker and thus possibly lessen his or her prevention efforts. In addition, the availability of benefits may increase the reporting of injuries by workers. It is also possible, of course, that workers' compensation has no significant impact on injury rates. The presence and direction of any impact of workers' compensation on injury rates is, therefore, uncertain; many diverse incentives are created by such a system and changes to it. Fortunately, as public attention focused on workers' compensation in the 1970s, a substantial body of empirical evidence accumulated whlch begins to unravel these complex • Issues.
The most fundamental issue, that of whether the introduction of workers' compensation influenced injury rates is discussed first. The impact of benefit level changes such as occurred in the 1970s will then be reviewed.
State workers' compensation laws were passed in the early twentieth century long before systematic high quality data on occupational risks were available. There is, therefore, little empirical evidence on any changes in safety behaviour that may have been induced by these legal changes. Only one study has been conducted on this issue (Chelius, 1976) . While the methodology and specific results are reviewed below, the basic conclusion was that the introduction of workers' compensation improved the level of occupational safety.
The data used to represent the level of occupational risks were deaths caused by machinery other than motor vehicles. Such accidents accounted for 16 percent of industrial deaths. Approxin1ately 87 percent of these n1achinery accidents occurred at the workplace. While these data are only a crude proxy for occupational risks, the state rather than federal nature of the laws, as well as the differing years of enactment, made possible a methodologically precise design for analyzing variations in the data. There are variations in death rates -across states each year; some states having workers' compensation laws and some not. There are also variations in death rates within each state over time. For some years a state had a workers' compensation law and for other (earlier) years it did not. A variety of techniques were used to control for the influence of other factors that could have affected death rates. These controlled factors included: per capita exposure to machinery, the business cycle, medical care, age. , sex, en1ployers' liability statutes, legislated safety standards, and technological change. Using several alternative specifications, the results were statistically robust; the in traduction of workers' cotnpensation was asso~iated with a lower level of work-related deaths.
Prior to the enactn1ent of workers' compensation, the assignn1ent of work injury costs was handled by the courts using both comn1on law and statutory rules for determining negligence. A key perceived defficiency in the negligence system was the low percentage of injured workers who were able to collect drunages. Those who were able to collect, however, typically received larger awards than the benefits auto1natically available under workers' compensation . . The change frotn court judgments to workers' compensation, therefore , was essentially a switch fron1 a low probability of collecting a large paytnent to a high probability of collecting a small pay1nent. Ashford and Johnson (1982) have compared the "expected values" (probability tiines an1ount of con1pensation) of both systems. This expected value is a tneasure of the injury costs assigned to the en1ployer. These calculations indicate that it is very likely that the expected value of injury costs assigned to the en1ployer was higher under the ·negligence system than under workers' compensation. This finding, when integrated with the finding that the introduction of a workers' compensation progratn was associated with a higher level of safety, indicates that the e1nployers' relative certaintly of being assigned injury costs was n1ore critical than the magnitude of the expected value of those costs. In other words, iinposing the injury costs on employers in reasonably certain tnanner appears to have been a key factor in raising the level of occupational safety.
• tion of the 2 effects. It is also possible that hjgher benefits reduce the number of actual injuries (because the higher benefits induce more preventive activities by employers than carelessness by workers), but that the higher benefits lead to such a large increase in reported injuries that the net association between benefits and the injury rate is positive. Another dimension of the reporting phenomenon is the criteria of eligibility for benefits (compensability). A study of air traffic controllers clearly indicates that if criteria for compensability are loosened, a "reporting" phenomena occurs. Staten and Umbeck (forthcoming) exan1ined the impact of a 1974 change in the Federal Employee Compensation Act which liberalized the standards necessary to den1onstrate that one has been psychologically "injured" on the job. This change took place during a period in which workers' compensation benefits available to an "injured" federal employee were substantial. On average, disabled controllers (federal employees) with at least 1 dependent qualified for benefits exceeding their normal take home pay. Since a controller would receive compensation for the duration of disability, more could be made by staying on the compensation rolls than by staying on the job.
After the 1974 legal changes, the nun1ber of disability claims based on psychological stress significantly increased. This finding while based on a relatively small work group with a uniquely generous workers, cotnpensation system and an injury that is unusually difficult to evaluate, makes an important point. The incentives transmitted to employers and employees n1ay well influence prevention activities and hence real injury rates. However, a compensation syste1n with generous benefits and a lax definition of what constitutes an injury creates incentives to report a compensable injury when, in fact, one has not occurred.
Current developments
The Reagan administration has begun to put its imprint on OSHA. As to safety, the primary new direction is the "voluntary protection program" .
6
Under this arrangement firms certified as having successful safety progra1ns are exen1pted from inspections and given priority treatment with any requests for variances from the safety standards. To be eligible a firm n1ust have: an ongoing safety program, an internal employee complaint mechanisn1, a co-operative atn1osphere between the employer and workers, and a good injury rate record. There is no requiren1ent that the employees be represented by a union. Given the evidence on the usefulness of worker management safety cotnmittees (Cooke and Gautschi, 1981 ) , encouraging them seems like a good idea. Giving praise and publicity to successful firn1s is also helpful, but it seen1s unlikely that the progran1 will have a signicant overall in1pact. It appears that progratn participants are going to be the firms which have been doing a good job. The forn1al rewards of inspection exen1ption and variance priority are sn1all and therefore unlikely to induce poor performers into significant changes.
On health issues, OSHA is currently reviewing several of its standards with the objective of (at least in the case of lead exposure)
... jmproving the cost-effectiveness of the standardfs] and ... re-evaluating the feasibility of the standard[s] in some industries. If the outcome of this reconsideration is a modification in the mix of engineering controls and personal protective equipment required to meet the permissible exposure lin1it ... such action would clearly result in major changes in the en1ployers' compliance programs. (OSHA, 1982) Similar flux in the status of health standards is indicated by the, at least ten1porary, exen1p-tion of the knitting and hosiery industries fron1 the cotton dust standard. The reason is the finding of a Inedical study that " ... indicates little or no excess risk of byssinosis or other puhnonary disease in the knitting sector at the low levels [of exposure] which exist." (OSHA, 1983) Whether these actions portend a basic restructuring of occupational health policy or just the give and take of transitory political squabbles is not clear. For are a larger role for actual wap losses rather than judplents u to t1teat of the parttaJ.
• It is UDcertain whether this round of attNnpted and to the workers' compensation system wiD be of any general stgnifleaace. major activity changing the workers' compensation system is judicial. Workers' has htnotlcaUy immunized from etnployee tort actions. 132 James R. Chelius task. As the evidence of ineffectiveness and inefficiency builds up there are at least 3 directions we might take. One is deregulation such as has occurred with much of the older price and entry regulation. Another, advocated by many economists is to modify the workers' compensation system to make it a true tax on injuries and illnesses; thus making use of and reinforcing the strengths of the marketplace. Third, and most likely, is a continuation of the current regulation with modest and marginal adaptations. We are searching for effective and efficient mechanisms for regulating occupational safety and health. The empirical
• evidence to date indicates we are a long way from our goals.
